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NOTES AND COMMENTS
of his land. The defendant may be carrying on his business in such a way
as to emit dust, soot, noise, odors, etc.
However, the law of nuisance has been applied in situations which are
entirely different from the traditional use. It may be applied where a de-
fendant has committed a fraud on a plaintiff or has used an unfair business
practice. For example, in the Illinois case of Edelman Brothers, Inc. v. Bai-
koff,59 the court did not hesitate to apply nuisance law to a commercial
fraud. There the plaintiffs were merchants in a Chicago neighborhood who
sought to enjoin the defendants from interfering with their business. The
defendants had been standing in front of the plaintiff's stores soliciting
prospective customers away. The court granted an injunction and said that
".... where the injury resulting from the nuisance is, in its nature, irrep-
arable as . . .loss of trade . . .equity will interfere by injunction ... "60
The court further said: ".... [W]e are of the opinion that the bill states
such facts as prima facie warrants relief by injunction against a private nui-
sance being committed by defendants to the injury of complainants in their
trade or business."6'
In most of the cases where nuisance law has been applied to com-
mercial uses, the courts have discussed a public nuisance theory and not
private nuisance. 62 It would seem, however, that a private individual could
bring suit on behalf of others if he suffered special damages due to the
commercial nuisance.
The law of private nuisance may also be expanded to cases of consumer
fraud and thereby take on not only an expanded but beneficial use.
CAROLYN KRAUsE
PUBLIC NUISANCES
The term nuisance is applied to wrongs which arise when a person
uses his property unreasonably or unlawfully and his conduct annoys, in-
conveniences or injures others.' Conduct that constitutes an actionable nui-
sance maybe defined by statute,2 or may depend on the facts of each case
and not be capable of definition.3 Nuisances are classified as either public
or private. A public nuisance affects the public generally; 4 a private nui-
59 277 Ill. App. 432 (lst Dist. 1934).
60 Id. at 441.
61 Ibid.
62 See Commercial Nuisance: A Theory of Consumer Protection, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev.
590 (1966).
1 Gardner v. International Shoe Co., 319 Ill. App. 416, 49 N.E.2d 328 (4th Dist. 1943),
aff'd, 386 111. 418, 54 N.E.2d 482 (1944).
2 See generally, I11. Rev. Stat. ch. 1001/2, § 26 et seq. (1965).
3 Patterson v. Peabody Coal Co., 3 Ill. App. 2d 311, 122 N.E.2d 48 (4th Dist. 1955).
4 Kuhn v. Illinois Cent. Ry., I1 11. App. 323 (3d Dist. 1903).
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sance interferes with the enjoyment by an individual or a determinate num-
ber of individuals of some right not common to the public.
As a rule, only the state can secure relief from a public nuisance. 6 But
if an individual suffers special damage different in kind from that suffered
by the general public,7 then the nuisance may be classified as both a public
and private nuisance and the individual may be entitled to relief in his
own right.
PUBLIC NUISANCES PER SE
Public nuisances may be clasified as nuisances per se and nuisances in
fact. Nuisances per se are those activities which are inherently nuisances
under any circumstances, and nuisances in fact are those activities which,
although not inherently nuisances, become so due to the manner in which
they are carried out.8
In Illinois the General Assembly has enacted an enabling statute per-
mitting municipal corporations to define a number of activities as public
nuisances. 9 Municipal corporations may declare that it is a public nuisance:
I. To cause or suffer the carcass of any animal or any offal, filth
or noisome substance to be collected, deposited or remain in
any place, to the prejudice of others.
2. To throw or deposit any offal or other offensive matter, or the
carcass of any dead animal, in any watercourse, lake, pond,
spring, well or common sewer, street or public highway.
3. To corrupt or render unwholesome or impure the water of any
spring, river, stream, pond or lake, to the injury or prejudice of
others.
4. To obstruct or impede, without legal authority, the passage of
any navigable river or waters.
5. To obstruct or encroach upon -public highways, private ways,
streets, alleys, commons, landing places, and ways to burying
places.
8. To erect, continue or use any building or other place for the
exercise of any trade, employment or manufacture, which, by
occasioning noxious exhalations, offensive smells or otherwise,
is offensive or dangerous to the health of individuals, or of the
public.
9. To advertise wares or occupation by painting notices of the
same on, or affixing them to fences or other private property, or
5 Edelman Bros. v. Baikoff, 277 I1M. App. 432 (1st Dist. 1934).
6 Swain & Son v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 160 111. App. 533 (2d Dist. 1911), af'd, 252
I11. 622, 97 N.E. 153 (1936).
7 Klumpp v. Rhoads, 362 I1. 412, 200 N.E. 153 (1936).
8 City of Pana v. Central Washed Coal Co., 260 I1. 111, 102 N.E. 992 (1913).
9 Wabash Ry. v. Sanders, 47 I1. App. 436 (3d Dist. 1893).
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on rocks or other natural objects, without the consent of the
owner, or if it is on the highway or other public place, without
the permission of the proper authorities: Provided that nothing
in this section shall be construed to prevent the municipal
authorities of any town, city or village from declaring what
shall be nuisances, and abating them within their limits.10
In addition to the quoted activities, the statute provides that buildings
used for the manufacture or storage of high explosives or wells for the
production of gas and oil are nuisances under certain conditions.1
Typically, while Illinois cities have adopted the provisions of Ill. Rev.
Stat. ch.100%, § 26 (1965), some also have adopted the common law of
Illinois. For example, the Municipal Code of the City of Chicago include
the following provisions:
In all cases where no provision is herein made defining what
are nuisances and how the same may be removed, abated or pre-
vented, in addition to what is declared such herein, the offenses
which are known to the common law of Illinois as nuisances may,
in case the same exist within the city limits or within one mile
thereof, be treated as such, and proceeded against as is provided
in this code, or in accordance with any other provision of law.12
Another problem now doubly covered by statute is garbage dumps. It
is a misdemeanor to dump garbage within a city, village or incorporated
town or closer than a mile from its corporate limits, except by authority of
the city.' s Furthermore, an Illinois court has held that a garbage dump
may also be a public nuisance and abated as such. 14
In addition, buildings used for certain unlawful purposes are public
nuisances by statute. These purposes are:
1. Lewdness, assignation or prostitution.15
2. Unlawful use, sale or storage of narcotic drugs.' 6
3. Murder,17 kidnaping' s or abortion.' 9
4. Storing explosives20 or selling or manufacturing certain weap-
ons..2
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 1001/2, § 26 (1965).
11 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 1001Y, § 26 (6, 7, 10, 11, 12 and 13) (1965).
12 Municipal Code of the City of Chicago ch. 99, § 3 (1965).
13 I11. Rev. Stat. ch. 100/, § 27 (1957). See Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 100Y, § 28 (1957).
Dumping garbage on the property of another without the owner's permission is a public
nuisance.
14 City of Chicago v. Fritz., 36 Ill. App. 2d 457, 184 N.E.2d 713 (1st Dist. 1962).
15 11. Rev. Stat. ch. 10014, § 1 (1915). Buildings used for prostitution and related
offenses are also declared public nuisances by Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, §§ 11-14, 15, 16 (1961).
16 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 1001, § 15 (1957).
17 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 9-1 (1961).
IS 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 10-2 (1961).
19 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 23-1 (1961).
20 I11. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 20-2 (1961).
21 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 24-3 (1961).
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5. A "gambling place," defined as "any real estate, vehicle, boat
or any other property whatsoever used for purposes of gam-
bling."22
6. Selling alcoholic liquor in violation of any provision of the
Illinois Liquor Control Act.23
7. Violation of civil rights24 if the place is one of public accom-
modation or amusement.2 5
The practice of certain occupations and professions without a license
or certificate is also a public nuisance. The statute regulating the practice
of medicine is one example.28 Other statutes cover the unauthorized prac-
tice of barbering, 27 chiropractory, 28 dentistry,29 embalming,3 0 funeral direc-
tory, 3 1 optometry, 2 plumbing,33 and public accounting.
3 4
When a lawful business is operated in violation of regulatory statutes,
it may become a public nuisance. This category includes blood banks,
3 5
swimming pools,38 buildings near airports,3 7 diseased bees3 8 and the dis-
charge of pollutants into the atmosphere.3 9
This list does not include all possible per se public nuisances. Even
though certain conduct may not be specifically defined by statute to be a
nuisance, it may be held to be a public nuisance in fact and abated as
such.
40
PUBLIC NUISANCES IN FACT
Public nuisances in fact, as distinguished from public nuisances per se,
are those activities which become nuisances because of the circumstances
under which they occur, and which might not be nuisances at all under
other circumstances. 4 1 Most cases involving public nuisances in fact result
22 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 28-3 (1961).
23 I1. Rev. Stat. ch. 43, § 178 (1934).
24 As defined in Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 13-2 (1961).
25 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 13-3 (1961).
26 11. Rev. Stat. ch. 91, § 16u.l. (1961).
27 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 163, § 14.92 (1965).
28 I1. Rev. Stat. ch. 91, § 16u.1. (1959).
29 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 91, § 71a. (1965).
30 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 1113,4, § 73.24c. (1951).
31 Ibid.
32 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 91, § 105.24 (1951).
33 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. I11,, § 116.63 (1953).
34 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 1101/, § 53 (1957).
35 Il1. Rev. Stat. ch. 111/2, § 610-101 (1965).
36 11. Rev. Stat. ch. I111I, § 94 (1931).
37 Il1. Rev. Stat. ch.-15, § 48.11 (1945).
38 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 8, § 124 (1965).
39 111. Rev. Stat. ch. l11/, § 240.3 (1963). See Illinois Air Pollution Control Act, 111.
Rev. Stat. ch. 1111/2, § 240.2 et seq. (1963), for definitions of air pollution and air con-
taminants.
40 Hall v. Putney, 291 II1. App. 508, 10 N.E.2d 204 (2d Dist. 1937).
41 City of Pana v. Central Washed Coal Co., 260 11. 111, 102 N..2d 992 (1913).
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when a person uses his property in a manner which, although otherwise
legal, is inconsistant with the rights of others in the community.
This test is illustrated by Swift v. People ex rel. Powers42 in which the
plaintiff sought by mandamus to force the Mayor of the City of Chicago
to issue a liquor license. The court held that although a saloon was a law-
ful business, it was a public nuisance in a residential neighborhood and
denial of the license was justified.
Applying the same test, the court in Village of Plymouth v. Mc-
Wherter"4 found that the breeding of animals was lawful but became a
public nuisance when conducted within the public view and hearing.
Although a private nuisance case, Gardner v. International Shoe Co.4 4
has been extensively cited by courts in deciding public nuisance cases. An
analysis of public nuisances in fact would, therefore, be incomplete with-
out an examination of this case. The defendant, which operated a tannery,
maintained an open sewerage pond, built at the direction of the Sanitary
Board of Illinois, into which it emptied waste and chemicals from its tan-
nery and waste from its toilets. These materials were allowed to settle and
the liquid therefrom allowed to flow into the Mississippi River. The plain-
tiffs, who lived near the tannery claimed that the odors from the pond
were "unclean and irritating". Holding for the defendant, the court said:
... there was no proof of injury to the health of any of the
plaintiffs, or that the plant or pool . . were improperly operated
.... In addition the defendant... established... the commercial
character of the neighborhood, which was clearly relevant in de-
termining the plaintiff's right to recover. 45
The court, in the Gardner case, noted two situations in which public
nuisances in fact are commonly held to exist in Illinois cases: (I) if the
defendant has failed to act carefully and prudently and failed to utilize
all available devices and techniques to minimize the discomfort and injury
to others; and (2) if the defendant has in fact caused damage to health or
property. As a result, if a person uses his land in a manner inconsistent
with the nature of the neighborhood in which it is located, the court may
find that a public nuisance exists. 46 This factor taken by itself, however, is
generally insufficient to support a finding of a nuisance in fact.4 7
In City of Chicago v. Fritz,48 the court found that the defendant used
42 63 Ill. App. 453 (Ist Dist. 1896).
48 152 Ill. App. 114 (3d Dist. 1909).
44 319 111. App. 416, 49 N.E.2d 328 (4th Dist. 1943), aff'd, 386 Ill. 418, 54 N.E.2d 482
(1944).
45 386 I1. at 432-33, 54 N.E2d at 488.
46 Phelps v. Winch, 309 I1. 148, 140 N.E. 847 (1923) (dance pavilion); Harrison v.
People, 101 Il. App. 224 (1st Dist. 1902) (bowling alley).
47 Village of Villa Park v. Wanderer's Rest Cemetery Co., 316 I1. 226, 147 N.E. 104
(1925) (cemetery).
48 36 Ill. App. 2d 457, 182 N.E.2d 713 (Ist Dist. 1962).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
his property carelessly and improperly. The defendant operated a garbage
dump that was constantly afire. Smoke, odors and ashes blew into adjacent
residential areas and across nearby roads. The court found the dump to
be an actual danger to the health of persons living nearby and a menace
to traffic. The defendant's dump was full, reeking and hazardous as con-
trasted to the carefully designed and operated settling pond in the Gardner
case.
In Patterson v. Peabody Coal Co.,49 the defendant operated coal driers
which occasionally caught fire by spontaneous combustion. Fumes and
odors from the fires invaded neighboring properties. The court held that
the defendant's coal driers were not a public nuisance and said:
- * * the evidence showed that the defendant did all in its
power to prevent ... and extinguish the fire when it started ....
The plaintiff failed to prove any lack of care on behalf of the de-
fendant in its occurrence. Therefore, this type of invasion is con-
trolled by the Gardner case. 5°
A similar conclusion was reached in Ward v. Illiopolis Food Lockers
Inc.51 The defendant operated a slaughterhouse, food lockers and a meat
market within the corporate limits of the Village of Illiopolis. Because the
owner used all available means to prevent noise and odors, in addition
to complying with all sanitary and regulatory requirements of the state,
the court held the manner in which the corporation used its property did
not constitute a public nuisance.
In deciding the Ward case, the court also discussed the second basis
for finding the existence of a public nuisance: actual danger to health or
property. It found that the plaintiff had failed to prove the existence of
such a danger and implied that if he had, it might have found a nuisance
to exist even if all applicable laws and regulations had been complied with.
In City of Chicago v. Spaulding,52 the court reached a contrary result.
The defendant operated an animal feed producing plant near a residential
area. Odors from the plant nauseated nearby residents to the point that
they could not eat. The defendant contended that the neighborhood was
largely industrial and therefore industrial odors should not be considered
a public nuisance. In holding that a public nuisance existed, the court said
that if conditions detrimental to public health are created, the nature of
the neighborhood is irrelevant.
Damage to property may also sustain the allegation that a public nui-
sance exists. In Wiley v. Elwood,53 a railroad maintained a coal shed on
49 3 Il. App. 2d 311. 122 N.E.2d 48 (4th Dist. 1954).
50 Id. at 317, 122 N.E.2d at 52.
51 9 IUl. App. 2d 129, 132 N.E.2d 591 (3d Dist. 1956).
52 15 IM. App. 2d 407, 146 N.E.2d 401 (lst Dist. 1957).
58 134 Ill. 281, 25 N.E. 570 (1890).
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its right-of-way in a thickly populated part of the city of Joliet. The in-
habitants of houses nearby sustained damage to their furniture and other
household goods from coal dust produced by the operation of the shed. In
granting the relief demanded by the plaintiffs, the court said that prop-
erty damage alone could support the action.
The reader should note that both the Ward and Wiley cases were not
true public nuisance cases since neither was brought in the name of the
public. In the Ward case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's slaugh-
terhouse was a public nuisance but failed to allege or prove any special
damage which would give them a right to relief in their own right. The
court stated that had a public nuisance been found to exist, they would
still have been required to dismiss the action because of the plaintiffs' fail-
ure to bring it in the name of the public.
In the Wiley case, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant's coal shed
was a public nuisance, but further alleged that they sustained special
damages. Under these circumstances, they had a right to relief without
being required to bring the action in the name of the public.
Most recent public nuisance cases have referred to statutes. For ex-
ample, in both the Fritz and Spaulding cases, the court pointed out that
the conduct complained of constituted both a public nuisance in fact as
well as a violation of statute (a public nuisance per se).
PRIVATE PERSON's RIGHT To RELIEF
The general rule is that a private citizen cannot maintain an action to
restrain a public nuisance. However, if an individual has been particularly
and uniquely damaged in a way which is different from the injury to the
public at large, he may be able to maintain an action in his own right.54
The "special damages" must be different in kind, not merely in degree. The
difference has been explained as follows:
If a trench be dug across a public street, every person in the
community who has occasion to use the street will be delayed and
inconvenienced. The loss of time in going around such obstruction
would be common to everyone. One person might be delayed only
a few seconds, while another, traveling by a different mode of con-
veyance, might be delayed much longer, and the nature of the
business being done might be such that in one case the damage
would be nominal while in the other it might be considerable, but
in all these cases the damages would differ only in degree and not
in kind; but if another person, attempting to use the highway in
the exercise of reasonable care, falls into the trench and receives
personal injury, or if his horse should fall into the ditch and re-
54 Swain & Son v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 252 I1. 622, 97 N.E. 247 (1912). The state,
however, would not be required to prove an injury to enjoin a nuisance. Stead v. Fortner,
255 I1. 468, 99 N.E. 680 (1912).
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ceive an injury, clearly an action would lie for special damage to
his person or property.55
In Swain & Son v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry.,56 the defendant built a bridge
over the Illinois River at a height too low for plaintiff's steamboats to pass
under it. The court, holding for defendant, said the injury alleged by the
plaintiff-being unable to freely navigate the river--differed only in degree
from that suffered by the general public, all of whom suffered under the
same hardship.
On the other hand, in Joos v. Illinois National Guard,57 the court held
that the plaintiff, a private citizen, had proved sufficient special damage to
maintain an action in his own right. The National Guard had a rifle range
adjacent to the plaintiff's farm. The bullets were a danger to all land-
owners in the vicinity. But, because the plaintiff occupied the property
directly behind the rifle range, he was unable to get people to work on
his farm because they were afraid they might be hit by stray.bullets. This
was held to be "special damage" sufficient to permit him to bring a private
action for abatement of a public nuisance.
Additional illustrations of "special damage" can be found where the
plaintiff's property suffers physical damage or a substantial decrease in
value. In Wiley v. Elwood,58 the court said that the fact that coal sheds, as
maintained and used, constituted a public nuisance did not prevent a
private person living nearby from maintaining an action against their own-
ers to recover damages for injuries suffered when coal dust fell on his
furniture, food and clothing.
In Carstens v. Wood River,59 the plaintiff owned property suitable
only for residential use directly opposite a city park. The court held that
although the proposed use of the park as a recreation center, including a
swimming pool, bathhouse and refreshment pavilion, might constitute a
public nuisance, the plaintiff's proof that it would greatly depreciate the
value of his property and render it unsuitable for residential use, on ac-
count of noise lasting late into the night, was sufficient "special damage"
for him to maintain a bill to enjoin the proposed use of the park.
These decisions illustrate the circumstances under which Illinois courts
have held that private persons may maintain actions to abate public nui-
sances. The essential prerequisite is that the plaintiff prove an injury to
some private right which he does not share with the public in general. If
he can do so, then he has alleged sufficient standing to maintain an action
in his own name, although his injury is caused by a public nuisance.
55 Swain & Son v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., supra note 54, at 627, 97 N.E. at 248-9.
56 Ibid.
57 257 111. 138, 100 N.E. 505 (1913).
58 134 Ill. 281, 25 N.E. 570 (1890).
59 332 Ill. 400, 163 N.E. 816 (1928).
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In addition to situations in which a plaintiff can allege and prove
special damages (such as those described above), a private person has a
statutory right to maintain an action to abate certain public nuisances. 60
In these cases he is not required to prove special damages. The statute
provides that:
A private person may after 30 days and within 90 days of
giving the Attorney General and State's Attorney of the county of
nuisance written notice by certified or registered mail of the fact
that a public nuisance as described in Section 37-1 of this Act,
commence an action pursuant to Section 37-4 of this Act, provided
the Attorney General or State's Attorney of the county of nuisance
has not already commenced said action.61
If a plaintiff can show neither special damages nor a statutory right to
relief, he does not have a cause of action to abate a public nuisance. Relief
will depend upon public action as it is explained in the following section.
PUBLIC RIGHT TO RELIEF
To this point, stress has been primarily placed on the private in-
dividual's right to relief. But public nuisances are Wirongs against the entire
community. Therefore, the use of this remedy by public authorities re-
quires discussion.
Whenever a public nuisance is found to exist, the state has a right to
relief without the necessity of proving special damages.6 2 A public nuisance
by definition causes injury to the public. When a public nuisance is found
to exist, injury to the general public is presumed to exist. Actions to abate
public nuisances are usually brought by the attorney general or a state's
attorney in the name of the public.
The nuisance approach, however, is not always an effective remedy.
The reader will recall the Gardner case, in which the plaintiffs alleged that
the defendant's tannery settling pond was a nuisance, and the Ward case,
in which the plaintiffs claimed that a slaughterhouse within the city limits
was a nuisance. Although both Gardner and Ward were actions brought
by private individuals, an action brought by a public authority would have
60 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 37-1 (1965). The following offenses from 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 38
(1961), are included: murder § 9-1, kidnaping § 10-2, aggravated kidnaping § 10-2, prostitu-
tion § 11-14, soliciting for a prostitute § 11-15, pandering § 11-16, keeping a place of
prostitution § 11-15, theft § 16-1, possession of explosives § 20-2, abortion § 23-1, sale or
manufacture of certain weapons §§ 24-1(a)(1), (7), unlawful sale of firearms § 24-3, gambling
§ 28-1, keeping a gambling place § 28-3, and concealing or aiding a fugitive § 31-5. Also
note that pursuant to the Illinois Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, any place resorted to for
the purpose of unlawfully selling, serving, storing, giving away or using narcotic drugs
may be enjoined as a nuisance by any citizen of the county in which such conduct takes
place. 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 1001; § 16 (1957).
61 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 37-5 (1965).
62 Swain & Son v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 160 Il1. App. 533 (2d Dist. 1911), aff'd, 252
Ill. 622, 97 N.E.2d 247 (1912).
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been equally unsuccessful in showing that a nuisance existed in either
case. The conduct complained of fell within a "grey" area. It was not quite
a nuisance but it did cause considerable discomfort and annoyance to the
plaintiffs. Public authorities can often more effectively prevent uses of
this nature through comprehensive zoning ordinances than by bringing
nuisance actions. Tannery settling ponds, slaughterhouses and similar uses
can be prohibited in areas where they would cause discomfort to nearby
residents.
On the other hand, the Fritz case, in which the defendant operated a
garbage dump, demonstrates the effectiveness of the nuisance remedy as
opposed to zoning. The dump was located outside the corporate limits of
the city. Its existence could not be eliminated by zoning, but Illinois Re-
vised Statutes ch. 100%, § 27 (1957), authorizes municipal authorities to
abate such dumps within one mile of corporate boundaries. The nuisance
approach proved most successful under the circumstances.
In control of land use and other areas of regulation, the public nui-
sance approach may appear cumbersome and obsolete when compared to
comprehensive zoning and regulatory licensing. However, public authorities
should recognize those situations where the nuisance approach may be the
only available remedy.
PAUL KOMADA
REMEDIES AND DEFENSES
Having discussed the nature of public and private nuisances, it is ap-
propriate now to examine the remedies available for both types of nuisance,
and the defenses thereto. The presentation of this subject matter will be
divided into remedies against a private nuisance, remedies against a public
nuisance, and defenses to both classifications. It must be kept in mind,
however, that it is difficult to give a case-by-case factual presentation in
the above manner because in most instances the determination of whether
an alleged nuisance is private or public is not made until the remedy has
already been selected and the case is at trial.
PRIvATE NUISANCES
Action at law for damages. As defined in an earlier section of this
symposium, to constitute a private nuisance to an individual landowner,
the interference with the use of his land caused by the neighbor's use of
his land must result in injury which differs in kind and not merely in
degree from that suffered by the public at large. If this is the case, then
the person suffering the injury can maintain an action at law for the dam-
ages suffered. Thus, the remedy available, to a large extent, is dependant
upon the nature of the damage suffered by the aggrieved party.
